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This paper investigates the efficiency of household investment deci-
sions using comprehensive disaggregated Swedish data, We consider
two main source.s of inefficiency: underdiversification ("down") and
nonparticipation in risky asset markets ("out"), Wiiile a few house-
holds are veiy poorly diversified, most Swedish households outperform
the Sharpe ratio of their domestic stock index through international
diversification. Financially sophisticated households invest more effi-
ciently but also more aggressively, and overall they incur higher return
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losse.s from underdiversification. The return cost of nonparticipation
is smaller by almost one-half when we take account of the fact that
nonparticipants would likely be inefficient investors.
I. Introduction
Modern financial markets offer a rich array of investment opportunities.
Households in developed countries can acctimulate liquid wealth in
bank accounts, money market funds, bond funds, equity mutual funds,
individual bonds and equities, financial products with insurance features
such as annuities and capital insurance funds, and derivative securities.
In addition, many households bave significant wealth in less liquid forms
such as real estate and private businesses.
How do households exploit these investment opportunities? Do they
typically follow the precepts of standard financial theory such as par-
ticipation (taking at least small amounts of compensated risk) and di-
versification (avoiding uncompensated risk)? To the extent that they
deviate from these precepts, are the costs of such deviation modest and
therefore explicable by relatively small frictions ignored in standard
theory, or are they large and accordingly hard to rationalize? How het-
erogeneous are household investment strategies? Are cross-sectional dif-
ferences in investment strategies correlated with observable household
characteristics such as age, education, and wealth?
These questions are of central importance in economics and finance,
but reliable answers are extremely hard to obtain because they require
a high-quahty data set on investment strategies. To study household
portfolios, we would like to have data with at least four characteristics.
First, the data should include a representative sample of the population.
Second, for each household, the data should measure hoth total wealth
and an exhaustive breakdown of wealth into relevant categories. Third,
these categories should be detailed enough to distinguish between asset
classes, and for some issues—notahly the question of diversification—
we would like to observe holdings of individual assets. Finally, the data
must be accurately reported.
In this paper we use Swedish government records to construct a panel
of wealth and income data covering all Swedish households over the
period 1999-2002. These data are available because Sweden levies a
wealth tax. In order to collect this tax, the government assembles records
of financial assets, including mutual funds, that are held outside defined
contrihution pension accounts. The records go down to the individual
security level and are based on statements from financial in.stitutions
that are verified by taxpayers. The data set also provides information
on real estate holdings and the income, demographic composition, ed-HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
ucation, and location of all households. For nonretirement wealth,
which accounts for 84 percent of aggregate household financial wealth
in 2002, our data set meets the four criteria listed above, giving us the
unique opportunity to analyze the financial behavior of the entire pop-
ulation of an industrialized country.
We study the stocks, mutual funds, and cash held by Swedish house-
holds outside defined contribution pension accounts. Using the return
histories of these assets, we estimate the total risk and systematic risk of
each household portfolio within a mean-variance framework. Our mea-
sure of systematic risk is covariance with a global equity index. To the
extent that stock returns are well described by a global capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), our risk estimates can be used to estimate the
means of Swedish household portfolio returns. We obtain four main
results.
First, the median household portfolio has a mean return close to the
maximum that is achievable given its standard deviation. Equivalently,
its Sharpe ratio, its mean excess return over cash divided by its standard
deviation, is close to the maximum level attained by a global equity
index; and its return loss, the difference between its mean return and
the maximum consistent with its standard deviation, is small. Earlier
researchers such as Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly (1995), and Goetz-
mann and Kumar (2004) have found that households own severely un-
derdiversified portfolios of individual stocks; but we show that mutual
funds and cash dominate direct stockholdings in many household port-
folios, limiting the return losses from concentrated stock portfolios. A
majority of participating households actually outperform the Sharpe
ratio of their domestic market, which can be explained by die substantial
share of international securities in popular mutual funds. This finding
is robust to the use of alternative asset pricing models.
Second, there is significant cross-sectional variation in the efficiency
of equity investment, as measured by the Sharpe ratios of household
portfolios, and in the return losses from underdiversification. At the
ninety-fifth percentile of the return loss distribution, losses are large
whether they are measured relative to the size of the portfolio, in dollars,
or as a fraction of disposable income. Thus a minority of Swedish house-
holds do appear to be severely underdiversified.
Third, households with greater financial sophistication, as measured
for instance by wealth or education, tend to invest more efficiently but
also more aggressively. Their portfolios have higher Sharpe ratios but
also higher volatility. As a result, sophistication generally has an ambig-
uous effect on the average return loss. In Sweden, we find that the
average return loss from underdiversification is larger for more sophis-
ticated households.
Fourth, measures of financial sophistication also predict the proba-71O JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
bility that a household will participate in the equity market. Households
with low education and wealth are less likely to participate and more
likely to invest inefficiently if they do participate. This result suggests
that nonparticipating households would likely invest poorly if they en-
tered risky asset markets. We show that the welfare costs of nonparti-
cipation are lower by almost one-half when underdiversification costs
are taken into account. Agents who are "out" might well be "down" if
they entered financial markets.
Some of our results confirm earlier empirical findings on individual
portfolios. Consistent with the results of Heaton and Lucas (2000), we
find that Swedish households exposed to more background risk, such
as entrepreneurs or large families, tend to invest less aggressively and
more efficiently. Similarly, our finding that richer households attain
higher Sharpe ratios seems consistent with earlier research documenting
a positive correlation between rationality and wealth (Vissingjorgensen
2004).
Our data set has significant advantages relative to previously available
data. Most work on household portfolio choice relies on surveys, such
as the widely used U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).' The SCF
is representative and measures all components of wealth, but it reports
holdings of broad asset classes rather than specific financial assets, and
it relies on the accuracy of voluntary household reporting. The Swedish
data cover individual financial assets, reported by financial institutions
and confirmed by taxpayers, who are subject to legal penalties for in-
accurate reporting.
Following the pioneering work of Schlarbaum, Lewellen, and Lease
(1978) and Odean (1998, 1999), a number of authors have looked at
the account records of individual investors reported by a brokerage
house.' These brokerage records are highly accurate reports of holdings
and trades in individual stocks, but they sample customers of the bro-
kerage house rather than the entire population and do not necessarily
represent total wealth even of these customers, who may also have other
' Recent sludies ihal use the SCF include Heaion and Lucas (2000), Polerba and Sam-
wick (2001), Tracy and Schneider (2001), Beriaut and Slarr-McCluer (2002), Carroll
(2002), and Bergslressei and Poterba (2004). Other surveys of wealth are the Wharton
survey conducted in the 1970s (Bltime and Friend 1978) and the UBS/Gallup survey
(Vissing-Jorgensen 2004; C.raham. Har\ey, and Huang 2005). botli of which rely on tele-
phone inter^^e^^•s, and the Health and Rciiremeut Survey (Juster, Smith, and Stafford
1999), which has high-quality data but only on older households.
^Recent papers using brokerage house data include Barber and Odean (2001), Zhu
(2002), Ck>eUmann and Kumar (2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005). and Ivkovic, Sialm,
and Weisbenner (2007).HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
accounts elsewhere. Similar difficulties afTlict registries of ownership
(e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000) and recent studies of asset
allocation in 401 (k) accounts and other tax-favored retirement
accounts/
Some other work has been done using government tax records. The
U.S. tax system requires reporting of wealth only in connection with
the estate tax, which is levied only on the holdings of the very rich at
the date of death. Blume and Friend (1978) and Kopczuk and Saez
(2004) have used U.S. estate tax records to study household asset al-
location, but it is hard to know how to extrapolate from wealthy and
elderly households to the broader population.
Mas.sa and Simonov (2006) have also studied the portfolios of Swedish
households. Massa and Simonov do not make direct use of Swedish
government records. Instead, they begin with an income and wealth
survey. Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden (LINDA), which de-
scribes a representative sample of about 3 percent of the Swedish pop-
ulation. LINDA contains high-quality data on income, real estate, and
overall taxable wealth but gives hmited information about the compo-
nents of financial wealth. Only the share of each household's wealth
invested in risky assets and its bank account balance are available. Massa
and Simonov merge LINDA with a data set on individual stock ownership
of Swedish companies from 1995 to 2000. Stock ownership data were
available in this period since Swedish companies were legally required
to report the identity of most of their shareholders. These reporting
requirements did not apply to mutual funds or to bond issuers, and
thus Massa and Simonov cannot measure bond or mutual fund holdings.
Their data set, like the brokerage records used by Odean (1998, 1999),
can be used to measure biases in households' decisions with respect to
individual stocks, but not the overall degree of diversification in house-
hold portfolios.
The article is organized as follows. Section II presents the data and
describes asset allocation at the aggregate and household levels. Section
III investigates the diversification of Swedish household portfolios, using
a mean-variance framework. Section IV relates portfolio efficiency to
household characteristics, Section V derives implications for the welfare
cost of nonpartjcipation, and Section VI presents conclusions. The on-
line Appendix describes our methods in greater detail.
'Recent studies of such accounts includf Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Madrian and
Shea (2001), Choi et al. (2002, 2004). Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), and Ameriks
and Zeldes (2004).71 2 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
II. Household Asset Allocation
A. Data Summary
To understand our data set, it is helpful to begin with a brief description
of the Swedish economy and tax system. Sweden is an industrialized
nation with a population of almost 9 million. The GDP per capita in
2002 is estimated at $27,300 when currencies are converted at pur-
chasing power parity; this is slighdy higher than the EU average of
$26,000. Sweden is characterized by a large middle class, lower inequality
in disposable income, and a more progressive tax and transfer system
tban most other industrialized nations.^
Swedish households are subject to both a capital income tax and a
wealtb tax. Capital income (interest, dividends, and capital gains) is
taxed at a flat rate of 30 percent, with deducdons for interest paid and
capital losses. The wealth tax is paid on all the assets of tbe household,
including real estate and financial securities, with tbe important excep-
don of private businesses and sbares in small public businesses.'' It is
levied at a rate of 1.5 percent on taxable wealth above a threshold,
which was equal to 2 million Swedish kronor (SEK) for married couples
and 1.5 million SEK for single taxpayers in 2002. The Swedish krona
traded at $0.1127 at the end of 2002, so these thresholds correspond
to $225,000 for married couples and $170,000 for single taxpayers. In
2002, 263,000 individuals paid a total of $430 miUion in wealtb tax.
Because of tbe existence of the wealth tax, the government's statistical
agency. Statistics Sweden (also known by its Swedish acronym SCB), bas
a parliamentary mandate to collect household-level data on wealth. Sta-
tisdcs Sweden compiles information on household finances from a va-
riety of sources, including the Swedish Tax Agency, welfare agencies,
and the private sector Financial institutions supply information to tbe
tax agency on their customers' deposits, interest paid or received, se-
curity investments, and dividends. Importandy, nontaxable securities
and securities owned by investors below tbe wealth tax threshold are
included. Employers similarly supply statements of wages paid to their
employees. In April, taxpayers receive a tax return on wbicb all tbe data
supplied by employers and financial institutions bave already been en-
* For 2002, we obtain a Gini coefficient of 35.0 percent for gross income (before taxes
and transfers) and 27.1 percent for disposable income. These coefficients are low by
international standards.
' More precisely, taxable wealth is calculated as 100 percent of the value of bank atcounis
paying interest above 100 SEK per year, bonds and fixed-income mutual funds, capital
instirance products, residential real estate, and cars and boats exceeding 10,000 SEK in
value, plus 80 percent of the valtie of "A-list" (generally large) Swedish stocks, comparable
foreign stocks, and equity mutual fund.s. We refer the reader to Swedish Tax Agency (2004)
for ftirther details.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
tered by the tax agency. The taxpayer checks the figures and, if necessary,
corrects errors and adds information or claims for deductions.
We compiled the data supplied by Statistics Sweden into a panel cov-
ering four years (1999-2002) and the entire population of Sweden. The
data set includes demographic information such as age, gender, marital
status, immigration status, and education, as well as household com-
position and identification number. All tax returns are filed individually
in Sweden since the tax code does not allow the possibility of joint filing.
However, the household identification number allows us to group res-
idents by living units and thus investigate finances at the family level.
There are about 4.8 million households in Sweden during our sample
period.
The panel contains highly disaggregated wealth information, which
lists the worldwide assets owned by the resident at the end of a tax year.
All financial assets must be reported, including bank accounts, muttml
fiinds, and stocks. The information is provided for each individual ac-
count or each security referenced by its International Security Identi-
fication Number. The database also records contributions made during
the year to private pension savings, as well as debt outstanding at year-
end and interest paid during the year.
We also have disaggregated data on income. For labor income, the
database reports gross labor income and business sector. For capital
income, the database reports for each bank account or security the
income (interest, dividends) that has been earned during the year. In
this article we use disposable income, and private pension contributions
as a fraction of income, as proxies for financial sophistication.
We believe our data to be of unusually high quality since the infor-
mation comes directly from Swedish firms, financial institutions, and
state agencies. The entire population is observed, so selection bias is
not a problem. We acknowledge, however, four possible weaknesses in
our data set. First, we do not observe the value of households' defined
contribution pension savings. These include assets in private pension
plans and in public defined contribution accounts that were established
in a 1999 pension reform. According to official statistics, defined con-
tribution pension savings had an aggregate value of $25.6 billion in
Sweden at the end of 2002, whereas aggregate household financial
wealth invested outside pension plans amounted to $131.3 billion. Our
data set therefore contains 84 percent of household financial wealth.
Furtbennore, since pension savings are usually invested in mutual funds,
their inclusion would likely strengthen our main finding that households
are reasonably well diversified.
Second, we observe the total value of capital insurance products, a
form of tax-favored saving, but we do not observe the allocation of theseJOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
assets.*^ We have made several alternative assumptions about asset allo-
cation in capital insurance and find in the Appendix that our results
are robust to any of these assumptions.
Third, bank accounts need not be reported to the Swedish Tax Agency
unless they receive more than 100 SEK (or $11) in interest during the
year. Missing bank account data can distort our estimates of the share
held by a household in risky assets but do not affect our estimates of
diversification of risky portfolios. As di.scussed in the Appendix, we have
employed several imputation methods to address this problem.
Finally, there is tbe issue of tax evasion, the main form of which is
probably the ownership of unreported international assets. We can cross-
check the accuracy of foreign holdings in our data set by comparing
tbe cumulative sum of aggregate investment flows over a long time
period. Since 1979, Statistics Sweden has reported two different mea-
sures of aggregate household investment: (1) the difference between
aggregate disposable income and aggregate consumption (imputed
from payroll, sales, tax, and transfer data supplied by firms and gov-
ernment agencies) and (2) the aggregate investment of individuals (re-
ported by financial institutions). The cumulated difference between the
first and the second estimates over the 1979-2002 period represents
about 6.2 percent of the aggregate assets owned by households at the
end of 2002. The discrepancy is caused by a variety of items, including
the consumption of Swedish travelers in foreign countries, capital gains,
and unreported foreign investment. This analysis suggests that unre-
ported foreign assets represent a modest fraction of household assets.
More generally, illegal foreign investments involve fixed costs and are
likely to be significant only for the very rich.
B. A^egate Asset Allocation
We report in table 1 the aggregate wealth of households in our data set
and its breakdown into main asset categories at the end of 2002. Spe-
cifically, we compute gross wealth as the nominal value of financial and
real estate assets held by the household. Aggregate gross wealth is ap-
** Capital insurance is a form of investment subjected to a special tax treatment by the
Swedish Tax Authority. It exists in two forms: unit link or traditional. Unit link savings
are invested in mutual funds. Traditional insurance products guarantee a minimum fixed
return, which between 1999 and 2002 could not exceed the 3 percent limit set by the
Finance Inspection Board (Finavsimpektionm). The taxation of capital insurance is based
on the Slattl&neranta. which is defined a.s the average market interest rate on Swedish
government bonds with a remaining maturity of at least five years. Swedish authorities use
the Slatsldnrrdnla as a proxy for the long-run nominal interest rate. Capital insurance
accounts are sxibjected to a flat tax on their market \-alue, whose rate is 27 percent of the
StaislAnerdnta. In 2002, this conesponded to a tax on market value that was slightly higher
than 1 percent.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 7»5
TABLE 1
AG(;RK(.ATF WEAt-TH STATISTICS (December 31, 2002)
I'. HOLDINGS
(in Billion Dollars)
Official
Statistics
(2)
Micro Data
(1)
AOdRKGATK
Al-LOCATION
(from Micro Data)
Financial
Share
(4)
Wealth Share
(3)
Financial assets:
Bank accounts 46.2 45.3
Money niarkci funds 7.2 5.3
Mutual funds 29.4 30.8
Domestic stocks 27.5 29.3
Intemationai stocks 2.3 NA
Capital insurance 12.1 12.1
Bonds and derivatives 6.9 8.6
Total financial assets 131.7 131.3
Real estate:
Residential 304.8 284.3
Non residential 42.2 60.1
Total real estate 347.0 344.4
Total gross wealth 478.7 475.7
Total debt M7.8 149.1
Total net wealth 331.0 326.6
Number of households 4,869,448 4,869,448
Cross wealth per household $98,313 $97,692
Net wealth per household $67,966 $67,072
9.7%
1.5%
6.1%
5.7%
.5%
2.5%
1.4%
27.5%
63.7%
8.8%
72.5%
100.0%
35.1%
5.5%
22.3%
20.9%
1.8%
9.2%
100.0%
NoTK. —'Ilio talile repons JRgicgalc wealth statisiics lor al! lesidcnt Swedish hou-schokis (in Derembor SI, 2002. We
coiivrn all financial v-arialiirs inio U.S. (liillars ising the t-xthangc rate ai ilif pud or2002 (1 SF.K = $0.1127). In col.
I, we aggregate up the value of tin- asset holdings observed for eatli lioiiK-iinld in iiur rairro data sel. C>)ltinTiT 2 repiira
ihe corTe.!p(nnling ofTiriiil smiistic published hv Statistics Swpdpn. We coiiipiHe in col. 3 iht- asset allotaUori of the
aggregate portfolio of financial and real estate assels in our data scl. and in col. 4 the allorarion of the financial portfolio
alone.
proximately $480 billion for the households in our data set. On a per
household basis, we estimate gross wealth at about $98,000, debt at
$30,000, and therefore net wealth at $68,000.
Financial wealth represents 27.5 percent of gross wealth, or about
$27,000 per household, and real estate accounts for the remaining 72.5
percent. Financial wealth is decomposed into its main components: bank
accounts, money market funds, mutual funds, stocks, capital insurance,
and other assets (bonds and derivatives).
Cash, which consists of holdings in bank accounts and money market
funds, represents 41 percent of financial wealth. Mutual funds, including
bond and equity funds, and direct stockholdings account for another
45 percent of financial wealth. The remainder is accounted for by capital
insurance products (9 percent) and direcdy held bonds and derivatives
(5 percent).
Direct stockholdings account for almost 23 percent of financial
wealth. They have a market value of $29.8 billion in our data set and
primarily consist of domestic equity ($27.5 billion). Since Swedish stockyi6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
markets had a market capitalization of S20L4 billion at the end of 2002,
the domestic investors in our data set owned directly 13.7 percent of
Swedish stocks, a figure consistent with the 14.4 percent estimate re-
ported by the Swedish Central Bank.' Foreign stocks play a minor role,
with direct holdings of about $2.3 billion. This finding is consistent with
the relatively high cost of trading individual foreign stocks.
International diversification, however, is readily available to Swedish
investors through mutual funds, which account for 22 percent of fi-
nancial wealth. Swedish financial institvttions have long recognized the
importance of international diversification and routinely offer their cus-
tomers a wide range of corresponding products. For instance, the most
popular risky mutual fund in Sweden, Robur Bank's Kapitalinvest, holds
half of its assets in foreign stocks. Other very popular ftinds, such as
SHB's Sweden/World or SEB's Aktieparfond, also invest substantially in
international equity. These funds make it straightforward for middle-
class Swedish households to achieve a good level of international di-
versification. We investigate in Section III whether households take ad-
vantage of these opportunities.
Table 1 also includes the official wealth statistics computed by Statistics
Sweden. Our data set matches these official statistics remarkably well.
Statistics Sweden reports aggregate financial wealth equal to $131.3 bil-
lion, which is very close to our $131.7 billion estimate. The aggregate
estimates are also quite close for each category of assets. The main
differences occur for mutual funds and money market funds. We at-
tribute this discrepancy to slightly different fund classifications." The
aggregated holdings in both types of funds are $36.1 billion with the
SCB data and $36.6 billion with our data. Our data set thus has good
aggregation properties, which confirms its reliability and accuracy.
C. Asset Allocation in the Cross Section
Aggregate statistics tell tts how the average dollar of wealth is allocated.
This can be quite different from the asset allocation of the average
hotisehold, however, because the wealthy invest differently than poorer
Mn table 1. domestic equity consists of all the publicly traded companies that are
registered in Sweden. This definition exchides transnational companies, such as ABB or
Astra Zeneca, which have important operations in Sweden, are traded in Swedish stock
markeLs, and arc incltided in the domestic indexes. When these companies are inchided
in the definition of domestic equit\; household direct investmenis in domestic stocks have
an aggregate value of .^29.74 hilHon at the end of 2002, which represents 14.8 percent of
Swedish stocks. The Central Bank estimate of direct domestic stockholdings (14.4 percent)
is thus contained between the low (13.7 percent) and high (14.8 percent) estimates from
(jur data set.
" We characterize a fund as a money market fund if the standard deviation of its returns
is less than 0.35 percent per year. This cutoff" coiTesponds to a substantial gap in the
distiibution of historical standard deviations and a shift in the names of the funds.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
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Ft(;. I.—<:omposition of the financial portfolio. The figure represents ihecross-seclional
distribution of the a.>«et allocation in the financial portfolio owned by Swedish households
at the end of 2002. We .subdivide households into gross wealth percentiles and report the
average asset share within each wealth group. Households in the lowest two deciles are
not shown in the figure because their total wealth is poorly measured and they hold almost
nothing but cash.
households (Heaton and Lucas 2000; Tracy and Schneider 2001; Carroll
2002). A detailed microeconomic analysis is required to obtain a good
picture of investment patterns at the household level.
Figure 1 illustrates how the composition of the financial portfolio
varies with gross wealtb. The horizontal axis shows percentiles of the
distribudon of gross wealth, starting at the twentieth percentile because
tbe poorest 20 percent of Swedisb households have almost no measur-
able wealth given the nonreporting of small bank accounts. The shares
of all risky assets increase quickly between the twentieth and thirtieth
percentiles and then become relatively stable imdl the ninetietb per-
centile. Mutual funds represent tbe largest fraction of risky assets held
by bousebolds in this region of tbe wealth distribution. In the bigbest
decile, however, direct stockholdings bave a quickly increasing share
and end up representing more than half of financial wealth for the
richest Swedish households. Thus while stocks and mutual funds rep-
resent comparable fractions of aggregate wealth, figure 1 illustrates that
mutual funds dominate stocks in most household portfolios. The wealth
composition of Swedish households is consistent with results reported
for other industrialized countries such as the United States (Bertaut
and Starr-McCluer 2002).718 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Although our data can be used to examine many aspects of hotisehold
finance, in this article we concentrate on diversification within portfolios
of stocks, mutual funds (including both hond and equity funds), and
cash (including both hank accounts and money market funds). We con-
sider these portfolios in isolation and measure their risks using a mean-
variance approach. We exclude capital insurance products because our
database contains their total value but not their asset allocation. We
have checked in the online Appendix that our diversification results are
robust to including capital insurance products with a range of reasoti-
ahle assumptions about their asset allocation.
Our data could also be used to study the risks of labor income, real
estate, and directly held bonds and derivatives joindy with the risks we
consider. However, this would pose significant measurement challenges
because the capitalized value of labor income is not directly observed,
the vahie of real estate is measured imperfecdy and infrequently, and
bonds and derivatives are numerotts, sometimes short-lived, and fre-
quently illiquid. Even excluding these other assets, we believe that mean-
variance analysis is informative about diversification within households'
equity and mutual fund portfolios. In principle, undiversified portfolios
could be used to hedge specific risks in income or real estate, but
pre\ious research has foimd little evidence of this behavior. Notably,
Massa and Simonov (2006) have investigated income hedging using data
on direct stockholdings of Swedish households, and they find no evi-
dence of hedging behavior except among the richest Swedish house-
holds. The main difference between their data set and ours is that we
measure mutual fund holdings, which seem less suitable for income
hedging than the direct stockholdings examined by Massa and Simonov.
In the remainder of the article we present a cro.ss-sectional analysis
for a random subsaniple that initially contains 100,000 households, or
slightly more than 2 percent of the Swedish population, at the end of
2002. From the initial set of 100,000 households, we exclude those that
have extremely low income or financial wealth (0.4 percent of the sam-
ple) or hold unusually short-lived assets whose risk properties are dif-
ficult to measure accurately (1.6 percent of the initial sample)." In the
online Appendix we check that our results are robust to the inclusion
of those investors.
For each household, we consider three types of portfolios: the complete
portfolio, which contains all the stocks, mutual funds, and cash owned
by the household; the risky portfolio, which contains stocks and risky
mutual funds but excludes cash; and the stock portfolio, which contains
'' Specifically, we exclude those whose average reported disposable income over the past
three years is less than 1,000 SEK ($H3), whose reported financial wealth is less than
.S.OOO SEK ($339), or whose portfolios include assets for which we have fewer than 24
return observations tbrough 2004.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
direct stockholdings but excludes equity owned through mutual funds.
The complete portfolio tells us the overall amount of risk taken by the
household; the risky portfolio allows us to decompose the risk the house-
hold takes; and the stock portfolio allows us to compare our results with
those of Goetzmann and Kumar (2004), who observe only directly held
stocks and not mutual funds. We find that 87 percent of households
that hold risky mutual funds or stocks own mutual funds, whereas 55
percent are direct stockholders. Furthermore, 76 percent of direct stock-
holders also own mutual funds. These facts imply that mutual funds
play a key role in household diversification.
In table 2, we report summary statistics for these portfolios as well as
other household characteristics in our subsample. A household is viewed
as a participant in risky asset markets if its risky portfolio share is positive.
A participating household takes financial risk and can make diversifi-
cation mistakes. With this definition, 62 percent of Swedish households
were participants at the end of 2002. Average financial wealth is sub-
stantially higher for participants ($41,000) tlian for nonpardcipants
($8,000). We also observe that for participants, the average value of the
complete portfolio we consider is about $35,000 as compared to $41,000
if we were to include capital insurance, directly held bonds, and
derivatives.
m. Diversification of Household Portfolios
We now ask how households take risk within their portfolios. We begin
by investigating portfolio rariance, tben assume an asset pricing model
and use it to conduct a mean-variance analysis at the household level.
A. Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risk
We observe at the end of year ; the portfolio of financial assets owned
by household h. Let «^ denote the corresponding vector of portfolio
weights. The portfolio generates a random return between the end of
year / and the next time the portfolio is rebalanced. Since we do not
observe rebalancing within the year, we cannot direcdy compute house-
hold portfolio returns. For this reason, we investigate the properties of
household portfolios by estimating the moments of asset returns and
then inferring the household portfolio characteristics.
. We begin by presenting results that impose no restriction on the mean
returns of stocks and mutual funds. The risk-free rate in Sweden is
proxied by the yield on the one-month Swedish Treasury bill. Excess
returns are computed for all assets at a monthly frequency in local
currency. We estimate the variance-covariance matrix L of the iV assets
and then impute the variance a'^ = w;,Ew;, of individual portfolios. Wer-o
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mers (2000) has used a similar method to evaluate the properties of
stock portfolios held by mutual funds. Given a benchmark portfolio, the
variance-covariance matrix Z allows us to estimate the beta coefficients
(3 of the assets and thus of the hou.sehold: |8;, = co^iS.
We present in table 3, panel A, the characteristics of the risky port-
folios owned by households at the end of 2002. The focus on risky
portfolios allows us to investigate diversification choices while control-
ling for differences in cash holdings. The cross-sectional distribution of
the risky portfolio standard deviation o^ is reported in the first row. The
total risk a^ has a median value of 19.5 percent per year and a seventy-
fifth percentile equal to 24.0 percent. Most households thus select risky
portfolios with moderate standard deviations. A sizable fraction of liouse-
holds, however, select risky portfolios with high a^, such as 36.4 percent
(ninetieth percentile) or 64.5 percent (ninety-ninth percentile).
We compare these results to a diversified equity benchmark. Because
Sweden is a small and open economy, it is natural to consider a diver-
sified portfolio of global stocks. We choose the All Countiy World Index
(henceforth "world index") compiled by Morgan Stanley Capital Inter-
national (MSCI) in U.S. dollars. From the perspective of a Swedish
investor, the domestic excess return on an asset or benchmark is the dif-
ference between its return in Swedish kronor and the Swedish Treasui7
bill rate. Since we investigate the diversification of Swedish households,
all our results are presented in terms of domestic excess returns.
A Swedish household that purchases the world index can adopt two
alternative strategies. First, it can hold the index and bear the corre-
sponding currency risk, earning the Swedish krona return on the index
("unhedged index"). Second, it can use currency forward or futures
contracts to hedge currency fluctuations ("currency-hedged index").
Under covered interest parity, the corresponding domestic excess return
in Swedish kronor equals the excess dollar return on the index over
the U.S. Treasury bill rate.'" Over the 1983-2004 period, the MSCI worid
index in U.S. dollars has a mean excess return of 6.7 percent and a
mean standard deviation of 14.7 percent, that is, a Sharpe ratio of 45.2
percent.
Given a benchmark index B, we consider the regression
K' = «/, + 0iJ^., + eA,<. (1)
where r^, and r^, denote, respectively, the domestic excess returns on
the household portfolio and on the benchmark. Note that this regres-
'" Solnik and MtLeavey (2003) provide a textbook treatment of currency risk and
hedging.—* en in en in
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sion has a free intercept term and does not impose any asset pricing
model. From this regression we obtain the variance decomposition
<fl = &I0I + ol,. (2)
The household portfolio thus has systematic risk \^^\ap and idiosyncratic
ik
We report in table 3, panel A, how the decomposition of a household's
risky portfolio varies with its overall standard deviation a,,. Specifically,
we consider 500 households around each percentile of a^ and compute
the average risk characteristics of these households. For the median a^
of 19.5 percent, systematic risk has a mean of 13.0 percent and idio-
syncratic risk a mean of 14.4 percent. Idiosyncratic risk is thus a large
determinant of the household risk exposure. The idiosyncratic variance
share
has a mean value of 54.9 percent for households with median total risk.
In other words, more than half the risk borne by a median household
in its risky portfolio is uncorrelated with the benchmark.
[.-ooking across the columns of table 3, panel A, we see a U-shaped
pattern in the idiosyncratic variance share. This share is high for house-
holds with very low and very high total volatility. The high share for
low-volatility households occure because these households often hold
bond funds, which do not move closely with the world equity index.
The final row of panel A shows how the mean beta coefficient varies
with total risk. The mean jS^ grows tnonotonicaily with o,, and equals
0.89 for households with median total risk.
B. Contributors to Idiosyncratic Risk
We next analyze the idiosyncratic volatility of a household risky portfolio.
As in equation (1), let e^, denote the regression residual of the portfolio
on the benchmark. We have e^, = S,'!, w,,^8,,,, where e,,, is the residual
in a regression of asset n on the benchmark. We consider a stylized
symmetrical model in which the residuals of all assets in a household's
portfolio bave the same variance o;,'^ and the same correlation p,,,, with
" Equation (2) imposes an adding-up consUnini across estimates of sy.stematic, idiosyn-
cratic, and total variance. This constraint is automatically satisfied lor sample variances if
all assets in the hoiLschold portfolio are observed over the same period ()f time, together
wilh the benchmark portfolio. In practice, however, some assets are observed for shorter
periods than others. In table 3, panel A, we present risk estimates that satisfy (2) by first
calculating idiosyncratic and systematic variance and then adding the two to estimate total
variance.724 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
each other. The variance of the portfolio idiosyncratic component
satisfies
(4)
where C,,^ = 2,,=, ^i^/, is a measure of the concentration of the portfolio.
Let c^ denote the average value of In C,,,, in the population, and C„ =
exp (cj. A log linearization of (4) around p = 0 and c = c^ implies
In (a..,) « In (a^,,) + -In (Q,,) + - - " 1 P.A- (5)
We can ask whether households that take a lot of idiosyncratic risk
typically do so (a) by picking volatile assets, {b) by holding a concen-
trated portfolio, or (f) by picking correlated assets.
Panel B of table 3 presents a simple empirical analysis of this decom-
position. The cross-sectional R'^ of tlie decomposition (5) is 98 percent.
Portfolios are sorted by their idiosyncratic risk, and we calculate mean
portfolio characteristics for 500 households around each percentile of
the idiosyncratic risk distribution. The first row reports idiosyncratic
risk, the second row reports the average idiosyncratic volatility of in-
dividual assets in the portfolio, the third row reports the concentration
of the portfolio, and the fourth row reports the average correlation of
assets in the portfolio.
The main influence on idiosyncratic risk is clearly the average idio-
syncratic volatility of the assets in the portfolio, which increases mon-
otonically with idiosyncratic risk. Concentration is U-shaped in idiosyn-
cratic risk, whereas asset correlation is hump-shaped. Households with
low idiosyncratic risk often hold concentrated portfolios of mutual
funds, whereas households with high idiosyncratic risk hold concen-
trated portfolios of individual stocks. In the middle of the idiosyncratic
risk distribution, households hold diversified portfolios of mutual funds
and stocks that may tend to be more correlated with one another. In
support of this interpretation, the last row of the table shows that the
share of direct stockholdings in the risky portfolio increases strongly
with the level of idiosyncratic risk.
These results show that in order to assess diversification at the house-
hold level, it is essential to observe holdings of mutual funds. The con-
centration of the stock portfolio, a statistic emphasized by Blume and
Friend (1975) and Kelly (1995), is meaningless without a complete pic-
ture of the remaining constituents of the portfolio.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
C Estimating the Mean Returns of Household Portfolios
Expected asset returns are notoriously difficult to estimate, and we have
only short samples of data available for some of the stocks and mutual
funds held by Swedish households. The median annual standard devi-
ation for a single stock in our sample is 55 percent, and it is observed
for 97 months or just over eight years. The standard error of a direct
estimate of its mean return is therefore 0.55/v'(97/12) = 19 percent.
Given the uncertainty in this direct estimate, we instead infer the mean
return vector (i from an asset pricing model. Even if the asset pricing
model is not exactly correct, it is likely to deliver better estimates of
mean returns than the direct approach; this is an illustration of the
general principle in econometrics that even false restrictions can reduce
mean squared error if they reduce the variance of an estimate more
than they increase its bias.
The global CAPM is a natural asset pricing framework for an analysis
of diversification since it captures the expected excess return due to
covariance with global equity markets. We therefore assume that assets
are priced on world markets in an international currency, specifically,
that the CAPM holds in dollar-denominated excess returns relative to
the U.S. Treasury bill:
r;, = ^^r:, + s^,. (6)
The market return r,', is measured as the U.S. dollar return of the world
index in excess of the U.S. Treasury bill. As noted in subsection A, r'
is also the domestic excess return of the currency-hedged world index
under covered interest parity. Our use of the global CAPM therefore
implies that the currency-hedged world index is mean-variance efficient
from the perspective of a Swedish investor. In the online Appendix, we
show that our results are robust to the use of a more general asset
pricing model, the three-factor Fama-French model.
We estimate ft, given L, using standard procedures summarized in the
online Appendix. Since the spread between the risk-free rate and the
yield on bank deposits can be considered as a compensation for bank
services, bank balances are assumed to earn the risk-free rate. We also
assume that all money market funds earn this rate, an assumption that
is consistent with the data we have on money market fund returns.
We report in figure 2 a scatter plot of household portfolios in the
mean-standard deviation plane. In order to produce a clear picture,
we plot a subsample of 10,000 randomly selected households. Figure
2A shows the risk characteristics of households' stock portfolios, which>/.-.• ...:.v~-^:"^V; •••:••. . • •
my^^^^sF^i ••••• - •
• Household stock portfelios
oCurrency-hedged world index
O Unhedged world lnde«
• Swedish Index
30 40 50
R*tum Standard Daviadon (%)
. Household complete potiblioe
^Currency-hedged world inden
O Unhedged world index
i index
203O40506O7OS0
Raturn Standard Deviation (%)
FIG. 2.—Scatter plots of hoiisf hold portfolios. A, Stock portfolios. The scatter plot il-
lustrates the mean and standard deviation of household stock porifolio returns. B, Com-
plete portfolios. The scatter plot illustrates the mean and volatility of household complete
portfolios. The mean retunis are inferred from ihe global CAPM, in which the ctirrency-
hedged world index (empty diamond) is mean-variant efficient. The graphs are based on
a random sample of 10,000 households at the end of 2002.HOUSEHOLD I>rVESTMENT MISTAKES 727
appear quite inefficient as found by Goetzmann and Kumar (2004).'^
Figure 2B includes households' cash and mutual fund holdings and
presents a more optimistic view of households' risk management. House-
holds appear much hetter diversified when we include their holdings
of mutual funds and scale their risky asset holdings hy their total fi-
nancial assets rather than merely their stockholdings.
In the online Appendix, we report the most widely held stocks and
mutual funds in our entire database of all Swedish households. For
individual stocks, we eliminate households that hold more than $5 mil-
lion in a single stock. This procedure filters out large insider holdings
and enables us to focus on "popular stocks." The telecommunicadons
company Ericsson is the most widely held stock in Sweden. It is directly
owned by ahnost half of direct investors, and its share of direct stock-
holdings (8.6 percent) is considerably larger than its value share of the
Swedish index (5.2 percent). Other popular stocks include telecom-
munications companies (TeliaSonera), fashion companies (Hennes and
Mauritz), paper manufacturers (Svenska Cellulosa), phamiaceudcals
(Astra Zeneca and Pharmacia), and banks (SEB, SHB, and Forenings
Savings Bank, or FSB). There is also a Finnish stock (Nokia). These
stocks are well-known household names, but they have relatively low
Sharpe ratios averaging 17 percent.
The 10 most popular funds are characterized by considerably higher
Sharpe ratios, averaging 30 percent. They are sold by a few large banks:
the aforemendoned SEB, SHB, and FSB, along with Nordea. We note
that most of them are internationally diversified. With the exception of
SEB Sverige, each fund holds more dian 25 percent of its assets in
international securities. The most widely held fund (FSB/Robur Kapi-
talinvest) contains 54 percent of international stocks, and the second
most popular fund (Nordea Futura) holds 17 percent in foreign stocks
and 33 percent in foreign bonds. These numbers suggest that popular
mutual funds enable Swedish households to achieve reasonable levels
of international diversification. None of these funds, however, hedges
for currency risk. It is thus considerably easier for Swedish households
to hold portfolios with the efficiency of the unhedged world index than
to hold portfolios that are comparable to the hedged world index.
D. Mean-Variance Measures of Diversification
We now provide a detailed quantitative assessment of the losses that
households incur from suboptimal diversification. The moments of all
'•' One popular combination of Swedish stocks is visible in this figure. Many Swedish
investors directly hold both Ericsson and TeliaSonera, a telecommunications stock that
was widely promoted in a privatization. The resulting two-stock portfolios form a hyperbola
visible at the right of fig. 2A.728 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECO>fOMY
assets and portfolios are based on tbe global CAPM (6) described in
the previous subsection.
Relative Sharpe ratio loss.—Diversification losses can be computed by
comparing the Sharpe ratio of a household portfolio to the Sharpe ratio
of a benchmark index, which need not necessarily be mean-variance
efficient. For every household h, we denote by fi^ and a^ the mean and
standard deviation of the domestic excess return on the risky portfolio
and by \ = fi,,/a^ the corresponding Sharpe ratio. Of course, the Sharpe
ratio on the household's complete portfolio is also S^. Similarly, we
define the Sbarpe ratio on the benchmark index as Sf, — iXp/a^. The
loss from imperfect diversification with respect to the benchmark can
be quantified by the relative Sharpe ratio loss:
RSRL, = l-f. (7)
The relative Sharpe ratio loss RSRL^ has several attractive features.
First, it is independent of the aggregate equity premium, which is no-
toriously hard to measure. In fact, it is easy to show that RSRL^, =
1 - ()3^/a/,)/(/3^/ff,,), so it depends only on tbe betas of tbe household
portfolio and the bencbmark with the mean-variance efficient index,
together with their standard deviations.
Second, when the benchmark portfolio used to calculate the relative
Sharpe ratio is itself mean-variance efficient—as will be the case when
the dollar CAPM holds and we use the cuiTency-hedged world index as
the benchmark—the relative Sharpe ratio loss is a nonlinear transfor-
mation of the share of idiosyncratic variance we reported in table 3.
The relation is
•2
(1 -RSRL;,)' = 1 --^. (8)
at
Thus a high share of idiosyncratic variance, as found in table 3, implies
a high relative Sharpe ratio loss with respect to the mean-variance ef-
ficient index.'^
Finally, when the benchmark portfolio is mean-\'ariance efficient, we
'•^ More generally, the relative Sharpe ratio loss with respect to an arbitrary benchmark
B satisfies
where o^* and a^,j denote idiosyncratic risk relative to the efficient index.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 729
also have that RSRL,, equals one minus the correlation of the household
pordbUo with the benchmark:
RSRL, = 1 - Corr(r;,, <,). (9)
This property follows from the fact that the right-hand side of equation
(8) is the R'^ statistic of the regression (1) or, equivalendy, the square
of the correlation of the dependent variable with the regressor.
Uncertainty about the relative Sharpe ratio loss arises from uncer-
tainty about the correlation between a bousehold's portfolio and the
benchmark index. We know by (9) that the median correlation is 0.65,
and we have 97 months of return data for an average asset in the house-
hold portfolio. The asymptotic formula for the standard error of a cor-
relation, (1 - p^)/\T, wherep is the true correlation and 7Ms the number
of time-series observations (see, e.g., Johnson. Kotz, and Balakrishnan
1995, chap. 32), implies that the typical standard error for a household's
relative Sharpe ratio loss is about 0.06. As we average across households,
we shrink the uncertainty about the average relative Sharpe ratio loss,
but the rate at which we do so depends on the correlation of idiosyn-
cratic returns across households, that is, the extent to which different
households follow similar undiversified investment strategies. We do not
attempt to calculate standard errors for average relative Sharpe ratio
losses in this article, but merely report point estimates.
In table 4, we consider three indexes for the benchmark Sharpe ratio
5^: (1) the currency-hedged world index, (2) the unhedged world index,
and (3) an index of the domestic stock market (MSCI Sweden Equity).
According to the global CAPM, the benchmark Sharpe ratio 5^ is only
27.4 percent for the Swedish index, but 45.2 percent for the hedged
world index, wbicb is mean-variance efficient by construction. The un-
hedged index has an intermediate Sharpe ratio equal to 34.6 percent;
this illustrates that the inefficiency of the Swedish index is due to both
currency risk and suboptimal concentration in national stocks.
Table 4 reports the cross-sectional distribution of the relative Sharpe
ratio loss on the complete portfolio in our sample of Swedish house-
holds. The first row uses the hedged world index as the benchmark,
the next row uses the unhedged world index, and the third row uses
the Swedish index. The median household has a relative Sharpe ratio
loss of 35 percent with respect to the hedged world index under the
assumption that the dollar CAPM holds. The relative Sharpe ratio loss
is smaller at 14 percent with respect to the unhedged world index.
Relative to the Swedish index, the median Swedish household actually
has a negative relative Sharpe ratio loss of -8 percent, indicating that
Swedish households are sufficiently diversified internationally to out-
perform their own domestic stock index. These results are consistent^
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with the fact that the portfolios of many Swedish households contain a
large fraction of international investments and mutual funds.
Finally, the table reveals large heterogeneity in the losses incurred by
households. For example, 5 percent of households have Sharpe ratios
below oue-third the level of the hedged world iudex. While a large
fraction of households seem to achieve a fairly reasonable level of per-
formance, a nontrivial fraction of the population invests in a highly
inefficient manner.
Return loss.—The reladve Sharpe ratio loss quantifies the diversifica-
tion level achieved by a risky portfolio. For complete portfolios, however,
this statistic provides only limited information on overall efficiency. Con-
sider for instance an investor who allocates a small fraction of her wealth
to a single stock and invests the rest in the riskless asset. The reladve
Sharpe ratio loss reveals the inefficiency of the risky portfolio, but the
investor might in fact be very close to the mean-variance frontier.
Accordingly we consider the following alternative measure. The return
loss is the average return a household loses by choosing the household
portfolio rather than a position combining the benchmark portfolio
with cash to achieve the same risk level:
RL,= iv,(S,a,,-il,), (10)
where w^ denotes the portfolio's weight in risky assets. In the mean-
standard deviation plane, the return loss is the vertical distance between
the household portfolio and the line connecting the riskless asset with
the benchmark portfolio. When the benchmark is mean-variance effi-
cient, this is the vertical distance between the household portfolio aud
the efficient frontier.
The return loss can be related to the relative Sharpe ratio loss in two
different ways. First, we have
RL,, = S,w,a,RSRU. (11)
The return loss is the product of the Sharpe ratio on the benchmark
portfolio, which of course does not vary across households, the house-
hold's weight in risky assets, the standard deviation of the risky assets
chosen by the household, and the household's relative Sharpe ratio loss.
This "total risk decomposition" relates return loss to the total risk taken
by the household and the portfolio inefficiency of the household.
Second, we have
(^^J (12)
The return loss is the product of the expected excess return on the
mean-variance efficient market portfolio, which can but need not beHOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 733
the same as the benchmark portfolio and of course does not vary across
households, the household's weight in risky assets, the beta of the house-
hold's risky assets with the market portfolio, and a nonlinear increasing
transformation of the household's relative Sharpe ratio loss. This "sys-
tematic risk decomposition" relates return loss to the systematic risk
taken by the household—equivalently, the mean excess return that the
household would earn if its portfolio were mean-variance efficient—and
the portfolio inefficiency of the household relative to the benchmark.
Both decompositions show that the return loss, unlike the relative
Sharpe ratio loss, depends on the expected excess return of the market
portfolio.'"' In the results that follow, we assume that this equals the
1983-2004 average of 6.7 percent for the currency-hedged world index.
It is straightforward to rescale the return loss to reflect alternative as-
sumptions about the world equity premium.
An alternative measure of portfolio inefficiency is the excess standard
deviation of the portfolio relative to an investment in the benchmark
portfolio with the same mean return. This is the horizontal distance
from the household's portfolio to the line connecting the riskless asset
with tbe benchmark portfolio. The horizontal distance isjtist the vertical
distance divided by the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark. When we divide
(11) by 5B, tbe horizontal distance is w^a^RSRL,,, a quantity that does
not depend on risk premia. Given the Sharpe ratios of the equity in-
dexes, it is straightforward to obtain estimates of excess standard de-
viations from the return losses we report.
In table 4, we report return losses for bouseholds' complete portfolios
(setting w,, equal to the share of the risky portfolio in the complete
portfolio) and for their risky portfolios (setting w^, equal to one). The
median return loss on the complete portfolio is 1.17 percent with respect
to the hedged world index. The median return loss is smaller with
respect to the unhedged world index at 0.30 percent and negative with
respect to the Swedish index at —0.11 percent. Median losses are about
three times larger, in absolute value, for risky portfolios than for com-
plete portfolios. This is consistent with the large share of Swedish house-
hold wealth held in riskless assets.
As with Sharpe ratios, we observe considerable heterogeneity in return
losses. The costs of underdiversification are modest for a majority of
investors but are substantial for a sizable minority. For instance, 5 per-
cent of investors have return losses on their complete portfolios of 5
percent per year or more.
One possible concern with these loss measures is that they measure
underdiversification costs in return units; tliat is, they measure costs
'' This expected excess return determines the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark portfolio
in (II), given the second moments of returns.734 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
relative to the size of an investor's portfolio. If an investor has only a
very small portfolio, the implied cost in dollars or as a fraction of income
may be negligible. To address this concern, in table 4 we also report
return losses in dollars per year and as a fraction of disposable income
(measured as an average over three years to reduce the influence of
temporary fluctuations). We see that the median cost of underdiversi-
fication is only $131 per year with respect to the hedged world index
and $33 per year with respect to the unhedged world index. However,
the distribution of dollar costs has a fat right tail. The ninetieth per-
centile is $1,190 with respect to the hedged world index, and there are
some large dollar numbers in the top decile resulting from large un-
diversified Swedish portfolios. Similarly, when we scale hy disposable
income, we find that the median return loss is only 0.51 percent of
disposable income, but the ninetieth percentile is 4.48 percent of dis-
posable income. Some extremely high numbers in the far right tail of
this distribution result from disposable income close to zero.
Connecting the dots.—^We now summarize how the various results fit
together. The risky portfolio of a participating household has a median
value of $4,295 (table 2) and a median j3^ with the hedged index equal
to 0.89 (table 3). Since the risk premium on the hedged index is assumed
to be 6.7 percent, the median participating household earns an excess
payoff of $4,295 x 0.89 x 6.7%, or $256 per year compared to a pure
cash investment.
In table 3. panel A, we observe that 54.9 percent of the risk borne
by the median household is idiosyncratic and thus unrewarded in the
global CAPM. The Sharpe ratio loss RSRL relative to the hedged index
is therefore 0.33 by (8). Since the hedged and unhedged indexes have
Sharpe ratios of 45.2 percent and 34.2 percent, respectively, the median
Sharpe ratio loss is 1 - (45.2/34.2)(l - 0.33) = 0.12 relative to the un-
hedged index.'^ These estimates match quite closely the Sharpe ratio
results of table 4.
The median volatility a,, of the risky portfolio is 19.5 percent (table
3. panel A). Since the return loss is RL^ = (5,„ - S,)a,, = S,j3^KSRL^, we
infer that the median return loss on the risky portfolio is 45.2% x
19.5% X 0.38 = 2.91% relative to the hedged index and 34.2% x
19.5% X 0.12 = 0.80% relative to the unhedged index, numbers that
are consistent with table 4. The corresponding doiiar losses from sub-
optimal diversification, $4,295 x 2.91% = $125 (hedged index) and
''• We note that
KftKl-i — 1 1 . I „ — 1 . U
where RSRL" and RSRL" denote, respectively, the Sharpe rado loss reladve to the bench-
mark B and efficient index m.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 735
$4,295 X 0.80% = $34 (unhedged index), also closely match the $131
and $33 estimates reported in table 4.
Thus, by choosing an underdiversified portfolio, the median house-
hold earns a risk premium of less than $260 per year on its $4,300 risky
portfolio instead of the $290 it could earn by investing in tlie unhedged
index and cash, or the $380 that it could earn by picking an efficient
portfolio with the same volatility. While this description characterizes a
large fraction of the population, we also find that some investors make
very poor choices and incur much larger losses.
IV. Who Is Underdiversified?
We have shown that many Swedish households choose reasonably effi-
cient portfolios, but a few appear to be dramatically underdiversified.
We now ask how the cbaracterisdcs of households predict the charac-
teristics of the portfolios they hold.
A. Decomposition of Return Loss
In order to investigate these issues, we decompose the return loss on
the complete portfolio into components related to aggressiveness and
portfolio inefficiency. We could do this using either (11) or (12), but
we choose to use the latter. That is, we measure household aggressiveness
using systematic risk rather than total risk. In the Appendix we show
similar results based on (11).
Taking logs of (12) under the assumption that all terms are positive,
we have that
(
RSRI \
\ ^^^ '
1 K.bK.Li;^/
where RSRL^ = 1 — (5^/5^) is the relative Sharpe ratio loss on the house-
hold portfolio. This exact decomposition relates a household's complete
return loss to the log equity premium, which is the same for all house-
holds, the household's portfolio share of risky assets, the beta of the
household's risky portfolio with the currency-hedged world index, and
a nonlinear transformation of the household's relative Sharpe ratio loss.
Of the household-specific terms, the first two are related to aggressive-
ness, and the last measures portfolio inefficiency.
Next we ask how these determinants of return loss covary with ob-
servable household characteristics. In table 5, we regress return loss and
each household-specific component of (13) onto demographic and fi-
nancial variables. Demographic characteristics are measured for the3i
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Efficient benchmark
Large loss
_,.•- Financially sophislicattd household
_„..•• Financially unsophisticated household
Small loss
Retum Standard Deviation
Fic.. 3.—Impact of financial sophistication on the complete retum loss. Rich and ed-
ucated households select portfolios with a high Sharpe ratio but also a high risky share,
resulting in a high complete return loss. C'onversely, unsophisticated households allocate
a small fraction of their financial wealth to an inefficient risk portfolio and overall incur
low complete portfolio return losses.
household bead, taken to be the household member with the largest
disposable income.
Column 1 of the table shows that the return loss increases with mea-
sures of financial sophistication such as wealth, education, the ratio of
private pension contribxuions to income, and liabilities. The remaining
columns reveal that these characteristics are typically associated with
more efficient investing (lower Sharpe ratio loss), but also considerably
higher shares of risky assets and in some cases higher betas for the risky
portfolio. Households with standard predictors of financial sophistica-
tion invest more in risky assets and choose more diversified portfolios,
but overall they bear bigher return losses than unsophisticated house-
holds. Conversely, the retired and unemployed dummies are associated
with lower investment skills and lower risky shares, which overall result
in lower return Io.sses.
One interpretation of these patterns is that less sophisticated house-
holds are aware of their limited investment skills and invest cautiously
because they do not feel sufficiently competent to achieve a high Sharpe
ratio. In figure 3, we illustrate how the combination of lower efficiency
and lower risk taking results in modest return losses for less sophisticated
households.
Entrepreneurs, defined as household heads working at least part-time
for their own businesses, tend to invest less in risky financial assets and
as a result have lower return losses than the rest of the population.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 739
These results are consistent with the findings of Heaton and Lucas
(2000). The natural interpretation is that entrepreneurs bear idiosyn-
cratic risk in their own private businesses, which discourages them from
taking additional risk in public equity.
Finally, we acknowledge that the explanatory power of our regressions
is quite low. There is considerable heterogeneity in investment strategies
that is not captured by the demographic variables in our data set.
B. Robustness Checks
The apparent inefficiency of some household portfolios might result
from tax opdmization strategies. The Swedish income tax code treats
symmetrically the main types of capital income: interest. di\idends, and
capital gains are all taxed at a flat rate of 30 percent. Investors therefore
have no tax incentive to purchase low-dividend-paying stocks. In addi-
tion, they can deduct IOO percent of capital losses against capital gains,
which limits the negative skewness in after-tax returns.
The Swedish wealth tax, however, can cause distortions in portfolio
choices because it is not levied on the stocks of certain companies (O
shares). This exemption was initially designed to reduce the cost of
capital for young innovative firms. In the online Appendix, we obtain
very similar return losses when we rerun our analysis on households
that do not pay the wealth tax. confirming that our basic results are
robust to the different tax treatment of O shares. Our results thus seem
robust to the relatively simple tax optimization strategies considered
above. We acknowledge, however, that tax optimization can have more
subtle effects, and we leave for further research the detailed analysis of
its implications for household portfolios.
In the online Appendix, we have also verified the robustness of our
results to alternative assumptions about the currency hedging of the
benchmark index, the year of observation (1999-2002), the use of the
Fama-French asset pricing model in place of the global CAPM, the
availability of leverage, and the fees charged by mutual funds. The results
presented so far ignore mutual fund fees, assuming that after-fee returns
obey the global CAPM in the same way that individual stock returns do.
Rough calculations measuring the fees on the 10 most widely held mu-
tual funds (in the range 1.3-1.5 percent), and assuming equal fees of
1.4 percent on all other mutual funds and index fees of 0.4 percent on
the benchmark, increase median return losses by about 30 basis points;
in future work we hope to be able to measure more accurately fund-
specific fees and the resulting drag on household investment
performance.
The online Appendix also discusses the nature of the age effect on
portlblio choice and calculates welfare costs of underdiversification un-74O JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
der the assumption that Swedish households have constant relative risk
aversion. Finally, we discuss briefly the extent to which our results may
be expected to apply to other countries besides Sweden.
V. Down or Out?
We now turn our attention to the population of non participants and
use what we have learned about underdiversification to compute their
welfare losses.
A. Who Participates in Risky A.'iset Markets?
We first investigate the decision to participate in risky asset markets. As
in earlier research (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen 2002a, 20026), the data set
allows us to investigate the correlation between participation and other
household characteristics. In columns 1-3 of table 6, we report the
results of a probit regression. The estimates show that a household is
more likely to participate if it has higher income, has higher financial
or real estate wealth, has higher liabilities, or is more educated. Partic-
ipation rates are also higher for retirees and investors with large con-
tributions to a private pension plan relative to disposable income. Var-
iables negatively related to participation include age, household size,
unemployment, and immigration. Entrepreneurship has no significant
effect. These findings are consistent with the assumption that risky in-
vestments require fixed learning and setup costs, which may be smaller
for more educated and sophisticated households and are worth paying
only if financial asset holdings are sufficiently large.
We determine the relative importance of these variables by consid-
ering a reference household that is assigned the average of all contin-
uous characteristics and zero values for all dummy variables. We tlien
examine one-by-one the marginal effect of each predicting variable.
Column 3 of table 6 reports the impact of increasing a continuous
regressor by one standard deviation or of setting a dummy variable to
one. We observe that financial wealth has the strongest impact on par-
ticipation: a one-standard-deviation increase in wealth increases the par-
ticipation rate by more than 20 percentage points. Disposable income,
age, education, immigration, and the sbare of private pensions also have
substantial effects in excess of five percentage points.
We conclude that variables that predict underdiversification, such as
low education and low wealth, also predict nonparticipation. It is pos-
sible that nonparticipating households are aware of their limited iu-
vestment skills and prefer to stay out of risky asset markets rather than
make poor investment choices. We next use this observation to ask what
is the welfare cost of nonparticipation.be
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B. The Welfare Cost of Nonparticipation
Economists often argue that nonparticipation in risky asset markets is
a serious investment mistake. Wlien one is calculating tbe return cost
of nonparticipation, it is standard to assume tbat a participating house-
bold invests efficiendy and therefore earns the equity premium. We
bave shown, however, that many households are underdiversified. We
now take this phenomenon into account and present more realisdc
estimates of the return that a household loses by nonparticipation.
The return cost to a household of nonparticipation depends on tbe
Sharpe ratio 5f and portfolio volatility w^af that the household would
select if it did participate in financial markets:
We now investigate several scenarios for the total risk w^af and the
Sharpe ratio S^.
First, we assume that if the household participated, it would obtain
the Sharpe ratio of a diversified index and would choose the average
total risk wfaf = 9.5 percent in the complete portfolios of participants.
The nonparticipation return cost RC^'is then 4.3 percent for a household
that would invest in the hedged world index {S^ = 45.2 percent) and
3.3 percent for a household that would invest in the unhedged world
index {S^ = 34.6 percent). Consistent with earlier research, we find
that the return cost of nonparticipadon is high if we assume an efficient
risky investment strategy.
It may be more realistic to impute the levels of .S',f and rvfof from
the observable characteristics of nonparticipating households. As a sec-
ond scenario, we regress the Sharpe rados and volatilities of participants'
complete portfolios on their observable characteristics and report the
results in columns 7-9 and 4-6 of table 6. We then apply the results of
these regressions to impute the likely portfolio properties of nonpar-
ticipants. This procedure suggests that the average nonparticipant would
select a complete portfolio with Sharpe ratio 5f = 27.7 percent and
volatility iv^af = 8.4 percent. Both these numbers are slightly lower than
the average among pardcipants, because nonparticipating households
are demographically similar to participating households that invest cau-
tiously and inefficiently. With these numbers, the estimated return cost
of nou participation is only 2.3 percent.
We can use a similar procedure to compute predicted return losses
for specific households. Household A has dummy variables that are ail
equal to zero. That is, the head of household A is a native Swede who
is employed, is not an entrepreneur, does not hold a high school di-
ploma, and is not contributing to a private pension plan. The house-
hold's nondummy variables (size, income, log financial and real estateHOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES 743
wealth, log liabilities) are set equal to the average among nonpartici-
pants (table 2). We impute that 5* = 28.0 percent and wfof = 7.6
percent and infer that the nonparticipation return cost is then 2.1
percent.
Household B has the same characteristics as household A but is an
immigrant. The imputed values 5f = 26.9 percent and wifaj = 8.5 per-
cent imply that the nonparticipation return cost is then 2.3 percent.
Similarly, household C has the same characteristics as household A but
is unemployed. The imputed values are S^ = 27.8 percent and
W/fo* = 7.6 percent, and the nonparticipation return cost is then 2.1
percent. These results suggest tliat nonparticipation return costs have
average values between 2.1 and 2.3 percent.
Overall, we see tbat the standard analysis considerably overestimates
tlie cost of nonparticipation by ignoring the inefficiency of household
portfolios. Households that stay out would likely be down if they entered
the market. Once we take account of this effect, nonparticipation ap-
pears to be a smaller mistake and may be easier to rationalize using
small frictions such as the participation costs postulated by Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995), Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras, and Sodini (2004), and Viss-
ingjorgensen (2004).
VI. Conclusion
In this article, we have used a unique Swedish data set to evaluate tbe
risk properties of household portfolios. We have found that tbe joint
observation of stocks and mutual funds is quantitatively extremely im-
portant for the assessment of household diversification. This should not
be surprising given tbat 76 percent of Swedisb households that own
stocks directly also hold mutual funds.
We have considered financial portfolios in isolation, ignoring human
capital and real estate. We doubt that underdiversified financial port-
folios can be rationalized by offsetting risks in labor income or real
estate, and previous research by Massa and Simonov (2006) has found
no evidence that households pick their direcdy owned stocks to hedge
income risks. However, our data set does contain a great deal of infor-
mation on both income and real estate holdings, and we hope to exploit
this information in future research.
Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of households participated in risky
asset markets in Sweden at the end of 2002. Participating households
allocated on average 40 percent of their financial wealth to cash and
60 percent to risky assets. Mutual funds represent the largest share of
risky assets for most households, except for the very rich whose portfolios
are dominated by individual stocks. The data set permits us to compute
the risk characteristics of the portfolio of risky assets. The median vol-744 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
atility is just under 20 percent, the median systematic exposure 0,, is
about 0.9. and the average excess return implied by a global version of
the CAPM is 6 percent.
We have found that many Swedish households are well diversified.
The median return loss implied by the global CAPM is 1.2 percent of
financial wealth, or about $130 per year relative to the currency-hedged
world index. This loss is modest even though it is very difficult for retail
investors to achieve the efficiency of the hedged world index. The
median loss relative to the unhedged world index is even smaller, only
one-quarter the size, and a majority of Swedish households actually
outperform the Sharpe ratio of their own domestic stock index. These
encouraging results reflect substantial international diversification,
which Swedish households achieve through the equity and balanced
mutual funds sold by domestic banks. These numbers ignore the fees
charged by mutual funds, but a rough calculation suggests that taking
account of such fees increases the average return loss by only about 30
basis points.
While a large fraction of retail investors choose well-diversified port-
folios, we also identify the unhappy few that select highly concentrated
risky portfolios. For instance, 5 percent of the population incur return
losses that exceed 5 percent of financial wealth, or $2,200 per year. For
1 percent of the population, the losses even reach 10 percent of financial
wealth, or $7,500 per year.
We have shown that predictors of financial sophisticadon (such as
wealth, income, and educadon) predict higher levels of participation,
higher volatility in risky portfolios, and higher Sharpe ratios. Richer and
more sophisticated households invest more efficiently; but they also take
more risk, so they bear higher costs from portfolio inefficiency.
Finally, we have considered the 38 percent of households that do not
participate in risky asset markets. We estimate the return loss from non-
participation at 4.3 percent if we assume that such households would
participate by earning the maximum available Sharpe ratio of the
hedged global index. But this number overstates the cost of nonparti-
cipation because non participants might not diversify effectively if they
did participate. The estimated return loss falls to 2.3 percent when we
estimate the likely investment performance of nonpardcipants.
The diversification achieved by many individual investors can have
multiple causes, including not only their own financial skills but also
the professional advice and diversified mutual funds provided by finan-
cial institutions. Such effects are difficult to disentangle in a cro.ss sec-
tion, but in Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007), we use the panel
structure of the data set to investigate household performance, includ-
ing rebalancing and asset-specific trading decisions, tlirough time.HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT MISTAKES
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